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Introduction
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation-
ship between conceptual grouping and adjustment level in normal
children. Another objective is to evaluate how conceptual group-
ing increases in adequacy with age.
The study of categories and category formation
. Accord-
ing to Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1962), the basic element of
all cognition is the category. To categorize is "to render
discriminably different things equivalent, to group the objects
and events and people around us into classes, and to respond to
them in terms of their class membership rather than their
uniqueness" (p. 1). A class may be equated with a category, as
may be observed in Piaget's statement (I960) that a "class-
concept is only the expression of the identity of the subject's
reaction to objects which he combines in one class; logically,
this active likening appears as the qualitative equivalence of
all the members of the class." Piaget continues by carrying the
reader through the logic that the presence of a class implies
the action of a classification because "only operations of
classing can engender particular classes." Hence, one of the
earmarks of membership in a class or category is the equivalence
of responses to different objects belonging to the same cate-
gory. Bruner, et. al. (1962, p. 232) refer to the "act of
concept or category formation - the inventive act by which
classes are constructed." In the same chapter (p. 244), they
define a concept as "the network of inferences that are or may
be set into play by an act of categorization." Categorization
or conceptualization begins by acting upon the objects of the
real world, "the sorting of data into separate groups based on
certain selected differentiating marks whether this sorting be
actual or theoretical" (Warren, 193*0.
One important feature of the concept is its symbolic
representation (Vinacke, 1952). Category formation together
with symbolic representation helps organize the data of reality.
The procedure by which Piaget (i960) attempts to explain dif-
ferent levels of intelligence depends upon increasing the dis-
tance between the symbols one manipulates and the objects of
the real world which are being symbolized. William James
(Allport, 1961) refers to conception as the function by which
we mark off, draw a line round, and identify a numerically dis-
tinct subject of discourse. He goes on to say that: "Some
conceptions are of things, some of events, some of qualities.
Any fact, be it thing, event, or quality, may be conceived
sufficiently for purposes of identification, if only it be
singled out and marked so as to separate it from other things.
Simply calling it •this 1 or f that f will suffice." This appears
to indicate that some aspect of reality must be detached from
its surroundings and given some symbolic representation to
qualify as a conceptual category.
Bruner deals with categories or, more precisely, equivalence
categories, as opposed to identity categories. The latter in-
volves classing a variety of stimuli as forms of the same
thing. Although both types of categories depend upon the
presence of some essential quality or qualities, the fact that
the identity responses are ubiquitous and are learned very early
in life, as well as the different nature of the inferences of
the two means of responding (one infers an identity, the other
an equivalence) leads one to consider them as embracing different
processes. In this investigation, we are concerned with the
equivalence category. The first subclass is the affective-
equivalence grouping which is the result of the evocation of a
common affective response by two or more distinct objects.
Schachtel (19^7) suggests that the affective category is formed
during the pre-verbal stage of childhood and, thus, resists any
logical reorganization based on verbal insight. Indeed, DoHard
and Miller (1950) argue that a major aspect of psychotherapy is
removing this pre-verbal affect resistance, making the categories
accessible to the more conventional or functional categories of
adulthood. The functional category, the second subclass, is a
more objective grouping and is based on the different objects
fulfilling the same concrete and specific task requirement. The
third type, the formal category, is formed when objects are
equated on the basis of intrinsic attributes or properties
other than a description of their use.
A question may now be posed: Is there not an infinite
variety of ways in which the objects and events of our environ-
ment may be categorized? To be sure, classes do not exist, per
se, in nature. They are the inventions of man. The categories
are limited by the existing stimuli, but not determined by them.
And what do we gain ty such categorization? There are
five achievements of the equivalence response, according to
Bruner: 1) The complexity of the environment is reduced;
2) It enables us to identify objects and events; 3) It re-
moves the necessity of constant relearning about new events;
k) It enables us to plan in advance what responses will be
appropriate and inapproiate; 5) It allows us to relate
classes of events rather than individual events, permitting
us to deal with problem situations without having concrete
objects and events present.
The categorization process has two components (Bruner,
I960), The one which we have generally dealt with is concept
attainment, the selective process by which we utilize cues to
render equivalent or to separate objects and events. Another
type of cognitive activity is the more commonly discussed act
of category (concept) formation, which, as previously men-
tioned, is the invention of a category. Thus, the learning
of categorization requires first a generating of an hypothesis
of differentiation, then a process of finding attributes that
will enable one to distinguish the "examplars" from the "non-s.
examplars" of the class thus formed.
In summing up several investigations dealing with cogni-
tive processes, Leeper (195L) indicates that:
What do we mean by inductive concept formation?
Partly, we mean a process that is defined by what it
produces—namely, concepts. It is the process of
developing a habit or a cognitive mechanism that permits
a person to respond to an object or event in terms of some
property of which he may or may not be aware. Furthermore,
we cannot say that a concept is present unless there is
some generality of application of the habit, and some
differentiation of those cases to which the concept applies.
• • • Inductively formed concepts originate in experience and
observations that provide the organism with a wealth of
perceptual materials. Inductive concept formation is the
process of recognizing, from this material, that certain
features of the material are related to certain other
features (p. 7^0).
All of the processes discussed, concept formation, cate-
gorization, induction, etc. , are developmental in the sense
that they appear at different stages of the intellectual growth
of the individual and show systematic changes at each stage.
Formal Developmental Theories of Conceptualization. Werner' s
developmental outlook (19^*8) is based on the sovereign principle
that there is an increasing differentiation and refinement of
the mental processes which become organized into hierarchies. At
the beginning of development, there is found a fusion of sensori-
motor, perceptual, and imaginative processes. Gradually, an
abstract mode of thinking (non-sensori-motor) emerges. Werner
says that it is "reasonable, therefore, to identify the develop-
ment of the human mentality with an increasing centralization of
superior ordering functions which give form and direction to the
lower activities. M
Werner also describes how analogous mental processes at
different genetic levels accomplish the same ends. One
analogous mental process that Werner mentions is primitive
abstraction. In primitive abstraction, things with identical
properties emerge as a unified pattern. This process of ab-
straction is based upon the tendency of identical properties
to form a perceptual unit. However, in abstraction that takes
place on a higher genetic level, there is the detachment of
common shared properties and its use in deliberately classi-
fying exemplars of a category as well as nonexemplars. Further-
more, the subject is able to formulate a linguistic description
of the common shared properties used to group exemplars if he
is functioning at a higher genetic level.
The above viewpoint is noted in the description given by
Goldstein and Scheerer of the highest degree of abstract be-
havior. As they indicate (19^1» p. 8), "the highest degree of
abstract behavior is required for the conscious and volitional
act of forming generalized and hierarchic concepts or of
thinking in terms of a principle and its subordinate cases and
to verbalize these acts." It is the ability to account to one-
self, probably in verbal thought, that distinguishes the highest
form of abstract thought from its lower forms.
A familiar approach to conceptualization is that of
Piaget. First, there is the notion that the development of
knowledge in the child is the result of the latter* s activity
(Kessen and Kuhlman, I962) , which may be dichotomized into a
logico-mathematical type (ordering, counting, classing, dis-
sociating, etc.) and a physical type (exploring to discover
information about the objects). Through these activities, the
child assimilates the external world and accumulates an adequate
knowledge of reality. It is Piaget 1 s contention that this
acquisition occurs by means of successive stages of activity.
A stage for Piaget has been defined in terms of four criteria:
(1) A period of progressive organization of a particular set
of operations; (2) the initiative period for the development
of the next stage; (3) the order in which the stages appear is
constant although the age limits vary; and (4) the newly
developing stage includes the preceding ones.
With this in mind, Piaget sets forth four stages in the
development of mental operations (which include internalization,
reversibility, and coordinating systems) extending from birth
to maturity (195U 1957).
(1) The sensori-motor period (0 to 2 years). In this
pre-verbal stage, there is no internalization of actions to
become thought. There is, however, the development of invari-
ants as seen in an increasing awareness of the permanence of
objects. The latter results from an increase in the child* s
ability to organize his perceptual fiald. The infant is mainly
concerned with the functional character of things and, in turn,
his activities are, for the most part, governed by his needs.
(2) Pre-conceptual thought (2 to 7 years). Intelligence
plays a greater role as the child can add past experience to
his immediate spatial environment. The child is capable of
breaking up the objects of his environment into their respective
parts, using his newly developed mental imagery and thought
processes. His language and thought, however, are still tied to
his immediate actions and thus are classified as being egocentric.
Reversible operations are still not within the child's capa-
bilities.
(3) Concrete operations (7 to 11 years). Here, the child 1 s
thought activity attains reversibility, enabling him to order,
combine, dissociate, etc., the objects, but still keeping him-
self tied to the objects themselves (thus the tern "concrete 11 ).
The child is now capable of classifying objects on the basis of
more than one characteristic as well as coordinating inverse
relationships (E> D, C, B, A and E< F, G, H). But the child is
still not able to generalize from one field to another. He
must relearn the rules whenever the class of objects changes.
He is not able to structure the concrete operations into an
organized hierarchy.
(*0 Propositional or foraial operations (11-12 to 14-15
years). This is the advent of hypothetico-deductive reasoning.
The child can go from the theoretical to the actual as well as
vice versa. His logic becomes concerned with propositions as
well as objects (reflected in his language by if... then clauses).
He can organize the operations into a hierarchy (i.e., group
vertically as well as horizontally) and handle a new group of
operations which includes combinatorial actions (permutations,
combinations, aggregations), proportions, mechanical equili-
brium, probabilities, correlations, etc., all of -which are not
connected with the logic of propositions.
Why does the child evolve through these stages? Piaget
rejects the notion that this change is solely a result of
maturation, or of learning from experiences, or of social
transmissions. For him, it is all these plus the "factor of
equilibration" # Mental development is presented as being
characterized by a continued change of the process of active
adaptation. The continuing mental development is concerned
with increasing order, with the reduction of chaos, and with
using the operational structures to maintain an equilibrium
with an environment which may cause disequilibrium.
This point of view has been subject to a good deal of
criticism, some of which has been caused by failure to
replicate Piaget 1 s results, or by critical evaluation of his
failure to use properly quantifiable methods, or by alter-
native explanations. Before going on to empirical research,
we shall first deal with an alternative explanation, one
which is more closely related to this investigation because
it is mainly concerned with the evolution of conceptual be-
havior.
Using his own block test designed to enable one to
observe the development of an artificial concept (as opposed
to observing already existing concepts), Vygotsky (19&2)
arrives at the following conclusions:
The development of the processes which eventually
result in concept formation begins in earliest childhood,
but the intellectual functions that in a specific combina-
tion form the psychological basis of the process of con-
cept formation ripen, take shape, and develop only at
puberty. Before that age, we find certain intellectual
formations that perform functions similar to those of
the genuine concepts to come. With regard to their com-
position, structure, and operation, these functional
equivalents of concepts stand in the same relationship to
true concepts as the embryo to the fully formed organism.
To equate the two is to ignore the lengthy developmental
process between the earliest and the final stage (p. 58)
•
Vygotsky further states that ?The new significative use of
the word, its use as a means of concept formation, is the
immediate psychological cause of the radical change in the
intellectual process that occurs on the threshold of adoles-
cence" (p. 59 )•
Vygotsky proposes a scheme of conceptual development which
includes three phases.
1. The syncretic phase, when the child tends to just
"heap" things together. Groupings are often chance events
and word meanings are vague. Such concepts are highly un-
stable and purely subjective.
2. The "complex" phase incorporates objects on the basis
of bonds that actually exist, but no shared property is
abstracted. These bonds are concrete and factual as
opposed to being abstract and logical. Five stages are
described; these include association, collection, chain,
diffuse, and pseudo-concept.
3. The third phase, the conceptual phase, embraces the
Ill
development of the ability to abstract, to combine syn-
thesis with analysis. Once capable of grouping on the
basis of a single attribute (referred to as "potential
concepts"), the adolescent is on the threshold of true
concept attairment, which he gradually acquires as his
•complexes* drop out and he learns to apply his abstract
concepts to new concrete situations.
It would seem that, since Vygotsky refers to concept
formation as an "intellectual operation in which all the
elementary mental functions participate in a specific combi-
nation" (p. 81) and since his phases have definite similarities
to Piaget's stages, that any attempt to explain the development
of conceptualization must embrace not only the direct, empiri-
cal approach to concepts of Vygotsky but the direct, empirical
approach to intelligence of Piaget.
Empirical Approaches to Cognitive Develoqaent. Hazlitt
(1930) declared that children are quite able to grasp relation-
ships at a rather early age; their limitations may be due to a
lack of language development and experience (cited by Vinacke,
1952). Studies Deutsche (1937) and Oakes (19^7 ) (as cited
by Vinacke, 1952) investigated the child's concept of causal
relationships. Both found a) Piaget 1 s "types" of thinking to
be relatively infrequent, b) a gradual progression in reasoning
rather than abrupt increases due to stages, and c) the child*
s
reasoning was specific to the problem posed rather than typifying
a general developmental level.
One major criticism of Piaget has been his terminology -
the inability to know just what is meant by euch words as
"realism" and "anaraism". Criticisms are also registered with
respect to the lack of information regarding the number of
subjects used, the influence that the type of problem used
would have on the subject's answers, and the supposed orderly
progression of stages. Welch and Long (19^0) tested 157 chil-
dren between the ages of k2 and 83 months on tasks requiring
the use of previously learned relationships (nonsense syllable
and geometric form pairings related to specific situations)
and found an increasing number of subjects passing at each
level, but there was no orderly progression.
We find a large number of studies confirming Piaget 1 s
results. After testing 385 children from ages three to 15-16,
Russell and Dennis (1939) were able to construct criteria for
progressive stages of answers with regard to anamism in chil-
dren^ concepts. Then, Russell (19*K)) tested 775 children in
grades one through eight and found that 98.5$ of the subjects
could be classified according to one of the stages. However,
Russell also found, as have others, that all the stages were
represented in every age group. Dennis (19^0), at the same
time, was evaluating this notion of stages in Zuni and
Navaho children and obtained similar results to those of
Piaget. Bruce (19^1) used the Piaget approach with Negro
children and also found distinct stages of development.
Three of the most thorough investigations of Piaget 1 s
theory embrace the studies by ftlki.nd (1961). He reasoned that
the main difficulty with Piaget* s work has been the absence of
statistical analysis and systematic design. The result was a
systematic attempt to replicate some of Piaget* s studies but
using an analytic approach. The first such study (196la) dealt
with the assumption of three stages in the development of
quantitative thinking: (1) gross quantities - single per-
ceptual relationship, e.g., longer than; (2) intensive quantity
a two by two relation, e.g., longer and wider; (3) extensive -
unit relations between objects, e.g., x is half of y. Eight
children were divided into three age groups (4, 5» 6-7) and
tested for these quantity relationships. The results agreed
with Piaget that success in comparing quantity developed in
three, age related, hierarchically ordered stages.
The second study by Elkind (196lb) dealt with the child*
s
discovery of conservation of mass (7-8 years), of weight (9-10
years), and of volume (JJ.-12 years). One hundred and seventy-
five children from grades kindergarten to six were tested.
The results upheld Piaget* s age ordered relationship on the
development of the concept of conservation. The third study
(196lc) was concerned with the child's ability to compose
classes of subclasses which Piaget equates with the attainment
of abstract class conceptions. Three age related stages are
reported by Piaget: 1. (5-6 years) - Gestalt impression, when
whole is broken down, it disappears (e.g., wooden beads, when
divided into brown and white ones, could no longer be seen as
wooden); 2. (also 5-6 years) - now the whole becomes identified
with the part; they cannot be compared (e.g., the brown beads
and the wooden beads are equated); 3« (7-8 years) - the child
has an abstract conception of classes and can make comparisons
between partial classes (e.g., there are brown and white beads
and they are slso seen as wooden). Elkind tested 100 children
in grades kindergarten to third; his results were in agreement
with the notion of age related stages.
Reichard, Schneider, and Rapaport (19^) studied conceptual
development in children from ages four to fourteen. Using both
the color-form and object sorting tests, they found that, as age
increased, so did abilities to make adequate groupings and to
give abstract, conceptual explanations of the groupings. They
postulated three levels of conceptual development, the youngest
being concretistic , the next (peaking about eight or nine)
being functional, and the last (reaching maturity about eleven)
being conceptual.
Thompson (19^-1), using three sorting tests and children in
grades one to six, found ability to generalize apparently in-
creasing with age. Yudin and Kates (1963) reported that 12
year old boys were less able in concept attainment efficiency
and strategies than 14 and 16 year old boys. The older age
groups were not significantly different.
From the studies in this section, it would appear that two
inferences are supported. First, the child's concepts change
by a progression through age related stages. The rate of change
is not constant for all children, development being affected
by such factors as experience, intelligence, socioeconomic
background, and vocabulary. Thus, a particular age group will
usually contain a sampling of most, if not all, the stages in
the hierarchy. Second, the child 1 s concepts are of a different
kind from those of an adult, not merely developed to a lesser
degree.
Role of Language in Conceptualization , It is the belief
of Piaget and his followers (Inhelder, 1962) that language is
essential for the conceptual systems based on the manipulations
of symbols. However, language is not the defining element of
all classification operations, Inhelder (1962) indicates that
the operations involved in conceptual categorization progress
from such beginning actions as bringing together and taking
apart to the more advanced operations of looking forward and
backward do not necessarily involve language.
In agreement with this point of view is Hebb (19^9) who
speaks of the varying content of a concept in relation to a
central, constant core which defines the fringe aspects of this
dynamism. Because people so often are unable to verbalize
(i.e., are unaware of what determined their action), there
must be some concepts without a verbal element. On the other
hand, it would seem as if some concepts are basically verbal
ones, the core of which is a word or symbol. "If we recognize,
first, that there are nonverbal concepts, we must recognize
secondly that some concepts are verbal only" (p. 133).
Smoke (1932) approached this empirically ty requiring
his subjects to learn arbitrarily chosen names for geometric
figures. They were chosen in such a way that the figures
could be varied while preserving the defining attribute, e.g.,
a •Dax 1 was a circle of varying color and size, with two dots,
one within and one without at varying positions and distances.
The criteria! attribute was the one dot within-one without cue.
The subjects frequently were able to give the right name with-
out being able to give a verbal definition of the concept.
Heidbreder (19^7) also found that subjects could nearly always
define the concept involved when the tasks used numbers or
concrete, familiar objects (80$ and 100$ correct, respectively)
but, when the tasks involved unconventional or unfamiliar
fonas, less than half of the definitions were - correct, even
though the subjects were quite capable of using it.
In a more recent experiment, Vincent (1957) used 27
wooden blocks varying in size, shape, and color. Following a
brief demonstration, the children (97 hearing, 65 deaf, ranging
in ages from six to eight, inclusive) had to sort them into
different categories. At all ages, the median score for the
deaf children was below Ql of the hearing children 1 s scores.
The amount of disparity varied with the nature of the task.
Vincent, after a detailed analysis of the results, concluded
that the lack of language was an important factor in the per-
formance decrement of the deaf children, although other factors
were involved.
Humphrey (1951) sums up much of the research in terms
similar to what Piaget and Hebb have said. "Thus, the process
of generalization or concept formation Illustrates the general
relation of language to thinking. Generalization is possible
without verbalization, but verbalization apparently improves
and refines the process. Just as, in general, thinking is
possible without verbalization but verbalization improves and
refines it" (p. 25^).
Vygotsky (1962) presumes thought and speech to have
different genetic roots. The two developmental curves are not
parallel and about the age of two they intersect and a new form
of behavior is initiated. Now speech "begins to serve intellect,
and thoughts begin to be spoken." Language and thought meet
again in puberty with the significative use of the word in
forming concepts and symbolizing them.
The relationship between language and concept formation
has been discussed by Roger Brown (in Bruner, et. al. , 1962,
and Brown, 1958). Brown points out first that the acquisition
of language involves more than just the development of a motor
skill; language acquisition leads to cognitive socialization
("The Original Word Game"). This orientation is similar to
that of Sullivan (1953) whose views will be discussed in the
next section. Second, Brown holds that the name itself is a
category of sounds, a linguistic category. The name is an
attribute of the non-linguistic category since the latter
evokes the former. Nonlinguistic reality is categorized by
means of a huge number of attributes, only one of which is a
name. The importance of speech is that it enables us to re-
duce the complexity of the nonlinguistic world. With the use
of language, the child may learn concepts involving objects
without actually contacting the objects, e.g., what a schizo-
phrenic is or when it is safe to cross the streets.
But the relationship between speech and the non-linguistic
world is not uni-directional, i.e., speech organizing the
objects of reality. The reverse is also true, or, as Brown
phrases it, "The ismorphic relationship can be useful in
either direction. An inescapable visual difference leads us
to look for a speech difference. We may suggest that speech
has less intricic importance than non-linguistic reality.
..
M
fc. 2°A). Thus, Brown, too, seems to take the position that
the role of verbalization is to refine, simplify, and extend
the process of concept formation, which he considers basic to
the socialization of the individual.
Maladjustment and Concept Formation
.
"Concept formation
is one of the main channels through which maladjustment en-
croaches upon thinking, and that in it we may be able to
discover early traces of impending maladjustment. 11 (Rapaport,
19^5, Vol. 1, p. 388). Rapaport sees concept formation as a
balance of induction and deduction, with different levels of
adjustment manifesting different levels of adequacy; the
poorer the adjustment, the more imbalanced the conceptual
process. He suggests that the schizophrenic probably must be
unable to achieve a balance between the processes of in-
duction and deduction so that his generalizations do not
apply appropriately to the objects they embrace; also, his
inductions from the exemplars involve peripheral attributes.
Another opinion that the development of conceptual
ability is not entirely a function of maturation is that of
Mussen (i960) who states, "A level of abstract conceptualiza-
tion is obtained only insofar as the underlying intellectual
processes themselves have acquired a stability that resists
the natural tendency to regress toward levels of concrete
symbolization whenever the talk becomes more difficult"
(p. ) # Personality maladjustment, as shown by regression
to earlier levels of development, is thus thought to inter-
fere with conceptual development.
Rapaport (195L) presents a discussion of the process of
thought development from its primitive origin as ideation.
In addition, he indicates the role that freely mobile cathexes
of need satisfying objects play in the acquisition of know-
ledge of reality. Finally, he indicates how repression may
interfere with the development of the secondary process.
Rapaport indicates that the drive organization of
memories is composed of need satisfying objects or even of
memories of incidental aspects of these objects, any one of
which or combination of which can be freely cathected when
the need for that particular object arises. These memories
often bear no logical relationship to each other and may be
grouped together purely by the freely mobile cathexes. This
stage of thinking or ideation has been termed by Freud (19^+6)
as the primary process. In time, the child develops an organi-
zation of memories based upon experience and realistic logic;
the groupings of objects, that are placed together, are
determined by the objective characteristics that they possess.
These memory frames of reference, which are coordinated to the
experienced reality, comprise the secondary process.
The development of groupings based upon realistic ex-
periences may be handicapped by repressions which do not per-
mit appropriate experiences to become part of consciousness.
The necessary and logical new relationships are not estab-
lished which then interferes with further logical development
of future experiences. In addition, the memory frames of
thinking which supersede the drive organization of memories
do not accomplish this task to any great degree. Drive organi-
zations of memories based upon affect then, partially determine
the groupings of events and experiences. These drive organi- -
zations of reality may not be as adequate as those based upon
the memory frames; necessarily, the bases upon which they are
constructed are much inferior from the viewpoint of realistic
logic.
Schneiderman (1955) states that repression may prevent
certain portions of the perceptual field from being experienced
by the perceiver, including an accurate self-perception. In
addition, there is the problem of irregular reinforcement in
the reality situation hindering discrimination. The last two
factors, blocking and uncertainty, tend to cause the creation
of inaccurate generalizations. This formulation is similar
to Sullivan's delineation of the socialization process (1953);
here he listed the frequency and the consistency of experience
as the crucial parameters of this process. Later diffi-
culties could be looked upon as the accumulation of inconsist-
ent experiences during the socialization process. Sullivan
felt this was especially true with regard to language develop-
ment. Favorable reinforcement from the significant elders is
necessary for the child to successfully acquire a language.
Another general problem of concern here centers about
those improper categories that cannot be remedied because
anxiety prevents further reality testing. When the child
desires information about an experience, he is prevented
from asking about it because the topic is anxiety provoking.
The resulting behavior is usually that the child asks many
irrelevant questions, using words to conceal what he wants to
know. The parents take him literally, but the child assumes
that his words refer to that which he really wants to know
about, i.e., we have a basis for an autistic usage of speech.
Thus, the problem of learning may be reduced to an
initial blocking at the perceptual level; stimulus generali-
zation is blocked at the outset by a failure to perceive all
the relevant aspects of the stimulus situation. This is very
similar to what Bruner (1957) meant by "perceptual defense",
i.e., the manner in which organisms use their perceptual
readiness to ward off threatening stimuli. Bruner feels
that the failure to perceive results from blocking by Inter-
ference from inappropriate yet highly accessible categories.
Repression, in this case, may be merely the establishment of
very narrow category limits (as mentioned earlier while dis-
cussing Papaport's views on repression) that prevents objects
from fitting the specifications. A criticism of this is that
the neurotic is oversensitive to traumatic stimuli. Bruner
responds with the supposition, that the acceptance limits of
the autonomic threshold are broad, and very narrow with
respect to reportable awareness.
The view that personality maladjustment is related to
concept formation has received much empirical support. Lipnan
and Griffith (i960) found a negative correlation (-.51, P
.001) between children's MAS scores and scores on concept
formation tasks. Granik (1955) demonstrated a relationship
between personality maladjustment and cognitive deficit when
equated for IQ level. Kennedy and Kates (I963) found that
poorly adjusted children had significantly more inadequate
sortings than well-adjusted children. Schulman (1953) found
that psychotic children give more inadequate responses than
normal children. In the latter two studies the object sort-
ing test was used.
The problem is to discover if poorly-adjusted children
are less adequate in their conceptual-language behavior in a
sorting test than medium-or well-adjusted children. Another
objective is to see if older children manifest more adequate
conceptual-language behavior in this sorting test than younger
children.
The two hypotheses, based on the theory and empirical
results previously discussed, are: 1. The well adjusted
subjects will be significantly different from the poorly
adjusted subjects on A) adequacy of verbalization, B) formal-
abstract verbalizations, C) functional verbalizations, D)
idiosyncratic verbalizations, and E) split-narrow verbaliza-
tions. 2. Age will be significantly related to A) adequacy
of verbalization, B) formal-abstract verbalizations, C)
functional verbalizations, D)idiosyncratic verbalizations,
and E) split-narrow verbalizations.
Two questions will also be posed by the study: 1) Will
a significant interaction occur between age and level of
adjustment on the dependent variables? 2) Will there be
significant differences between the adjustment groups at
each age level for the dependent variables?
Method
Subjects , The subjects consisted of 90 students; sixty
attend the elementary school in Orange, Massachusetts, and
thirty attend the junior high school in Easthamptdn, Massa-
chusetts. The sixty elementary school subjects were drawn
from an original population of 166 students in the second
and fifth grades. The remaining thirty came from a popula-
tion of 96 students in the eighth grade. All the students
were administered the California Test of Personality. On
the basis of their scores on this test, the subjects were
divided into three groups at each age level. The well ad-
justed subjects earned scores between the 70th and the 90th
percentile on the California Test of Personality; the medium
adjusted subjects 1 scores were between the 40th and the 60th
percentiles; the poorly adjusted subjects were in the range
between the 5th and the 30th percentiles. Nine groups of
ten subjects each were thus composed, with three adjustment
groups at each of the three age levels (Table l).
Test Materials .
A. The Goldstein-Gelb-Weigl Objects Sorting Test, as
modified by Rapaport, Gill, and Schafer (19^5) » was
the measure of conceptual abilities. The passive phase
of this test was used because it has been shown to be
sufficiently difficult for subjects up to the age of
14 years (Reichard, Schneider, and Rapaport, 19^). In
Table 1
Number of Subjects at Each Age Level
and Each Adjustment Level
Adjustment-Level
Age Level Well Medium Poor Total
8 years 10 10 10 30
11 years 10 10 10 30
14 1 years 10 10 10 JO
Total 30 30 30 90
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the passive phase each subject is individually tested
by the experimenter who presents twelve pre-established
groups of objects, one group at a time. The subject
is asked to state the common conceptual content of
each group. His responses are recorded verbatim;
these responses are evaluated according to the scoring
system developed by Kates, Kates, and Michael (I960),
The twelve groups of items are shown in the Appendix.
The California Test of Personality (Thorpe, Clark,
and Teige, 1953 revision) was used to provide an object-
ive score of adjustment. The test is organized around
the concept of life adjustment as a balance between
personal and social adjustment. Personal adjustment is
assumed to be based on feelings of personal security
and social adjustment on feelings of social security.
These two aspects of life adjustment are further sub-
divided, for test purposes, into the following components:
1. Personal Adjustment - A) Self-reliance, B) Sense of
Personal Worth, C) Sense of Personal Freedom, D) Feeling
of Belonging, E) Withdrawing Tendencies, F) Nervous
Symptoms; 2. Social Adjustment - A) Social Standards,
B) Social Skills, C) Anti-social Tendencies, D) Family
Relations, E) School Relations, F) Community Relations.
Reliability, as measured by the Kuder-Richardson split-
half reliability coefficient, is .88 for the primary level
(255 cases), .94 for the elementary level (648 cases), and
• 96 for the intermediate level (U36 cases).
Validity is based on the test's avowed purpose to
"provide a frame of reference regarding the nature of
personality determinants and their relationships to each
other and to their total functioning, H Although no actual
validity coefficients are given, an accompanying manual
describes 90 studies in which the CTP illustrates pre-
dictive or concurrent validity (1953) • One of these
studies is by Jackson (19^6), who compares the CTP with
an interview technique, experimenter's ratings, teacher's
ratings, and parent's ratings. The relative effective-
ness of a technique may be interpreted as its contribu-
tion of a weight to the total minimum-between or the
minimum-within individual personal variance. On this
basis, total adjustment of the student was most effectively
evaluated by the CTP, a paper and pencil technique which
"provides guidance material on a maximum number of students
with a minimum use of tame." The test has also been suc-
cessfully used to separate adjustment groups and confirm
predictions about the group's behavior (Taylor and Combs,
1952, Granik, 1955, and Kennedy and Kates, I963).
For grades 1-8, the median IQ of the standardization
sample was 100.0 and the standard deviation was 16.0.
For the standardization subjects in grade nine, the median
IQ was 101.5 and the standard deviation was 15. 5» Of the
total standardization sample, 70$ were making normal
progress, 20$ were retarded ij years, and 10$ were acceler-
ated 1^ years in school work. Also, 85$ of the population
were Caucasian, the rest being divided among many minority
groups, including Negro.
Procedure . The California Test of Personality was
administered to 83 students in the second grade, to 83
students in the fifth grade, and to 96 students in the
eighth grade. On each grade level, 30 subjects were
selected on the basis of their Californai scores. There
were three adjustment groups at each grade level, making
a total of 9 groups. Each group had 10 subjects, with 5
boys and 5 girls. The well adjusted groups were composed
of subjects whose scores fell between the 70th and the
90th percentiles; the scores for the medium adjusted
groups were between the 40th and 60th percentiles; and
the poorly adjusted subjects had scores that ranged be-
tween the 5th and the 30th percentiles.
All groups were matched on I.Q. (see Table 2) and
socioeconomic background (see Appendix). The second grade
subjects were chosen so that the average of the three
groups at this age would be as close as possible to 8
years. Sijuilarly, the fifth and eighth grade groups were
selected so that their average ages would be as nearly as
possible to U and 14 years respectively (see Table 2).
Each subject was individually examined on the passive
phase of the Goldstein-Gelb-Weigl test. First, an example
Table 2
Means and standard deviations
for age and I.Q. of the subject groups
Ape
Adjustment Level
Well Medium Poor
m s,o m s.o m s.o,
Overall
8 age 8.0 2.3 8.0 3.1 8.0 2.9 8.0 2.8
IQ 106.7 20.5 100.9 9.2 99.2 14.8 102.2 15.3
11 age 11.0 2.8 11.1 2.7 11.0 2.7 11.0 2.7
IQ 101.9 8.0 99.613.9 102.6 10.4 101.4 11.7
14 age 14.0 2.3 14.0 3.5 14.0 3.4 l^.o 3.4
IQ 104.4 7.1 104.4 8.1 102.2 5.5 103.7 6.9
Overall age - - - -
Overall IQ 104.4 15.6 102.4 9.9 100.3 9.7
was demonstrated to the subject who was encouraged to
offer a berbalization that covered adequately and ex-
clusively the objects shown him ty the experimenter (see
Appendix for example items and instructions). After the
subject demonstrated that he knew what was required of
him, the experimenter proceeded with the experimental task.
The first group of objects (see Appendix) was placed
on the desk and the subject was questioned according to the
following standardized interrogation:
QUESTIONS:
1. When definition is not all inclusive - What
have these objects to do with it?
2# When definition is vague - It is not quite
clear to me what you mean; would you explain
it?
3# When subject subdivides the group - But "why
do they all belong together?
When subject says that they do not belong to-
gether - My question was why do they belong
together?
5. When subjects asks if he is right - there is
no right or wrong; I am only interested in the
reasoning.
6. Bizarre or nonsensical definitions should not
be questioning during the test since that might
influence the subject's mode of responding.
Scoring Procedure . Each response was scored for ade-
quacy of verbalization, for level of verbalization (whether
formal-abstract or functional), for idiosyncratic verbaliza-
tion, and for split-narrow verbalization according to the
criteria established by Kates, Kates, and Michael (i960).
They are as follows:
1. Adequate Verbalizations ,
An adequate verbalization is one which covers
correctly and completely the objects sorted.
2. Percentage of formal - abstract verbalizations
.
The criteria for membership in these categories
or the defining attributes are properties in-
herent in the objects themselves. There are
several types of formal categories but the type
we are concerned with is predominantly the
formal conjunctive category, A conjunctive
category is defined by the joint presence of
the appropriate value of one or several attri-
butes. "All these objects are red" is an
example of a formal conjunctive category.
Formal categories can be broken down into the
following two types based on the degree of
closeness to the specific properties of the
objects concerned.
a. Formal primary—These categories deal
with a higher level of conceptualization
that depends on the qualities of shape
,
size, form, texture, smell, color, etc.,
for the defining attributes: Examples:
"They are all rectangular." "They are
all red."
b. Formal Generic—These categories deal
with a still higher level of categori-
zation. Defining attributes here depend
upon the sharing of a complex set of
attributes, usually several of the
"formal-primary" type. A further
characteristic of this category type is
its extreme openess. New things can be
admitted. Examples: "They all are
tools." "They are silverware." "They
are all metal."
The percentage of such responses was found by placing
the number of formal-abstract verbalizations over the num-
ber of adequate verbalizations for each subject.
3. Percentage of functional verbalizations .
The members of a functional category are all
grouped together because they share common
functions. Equivalence is based on external
function. Examples: "All these objects can
dig no holes." "All these objects are used for
eating," The percentage of such responses was
found by placing the number of functional
verbalizations over the number of adequate
verbalizations for each subject.
^. Idiosyncratic verbalizations
.
Four types of responses were included. They are:
a. Syncretistic—"All are made of wood."
"All are grown from plants." An appear-
ing functional or formal category which
is extremely vague and general and applies
almost to the whole set of objects as well
as the class for which it is used.
b. Fabulated—start out with one attribute
of an object and make stories which in-
clude all the objects in the group.
c. Symbolic—the meaning of objects are
changed. Reinterpret the meaning of the
object and group the objects on the basis
of this new symbolic sorting.
d. Chain definitions—go from wooden object
to object with wooden handles. Then,
from a different attribute of that object
to another object which shares that dif-
ferent attribute and so forth. Objects
are linked by a chain of concepts.
5» Split-Narrow verbalizations .
This categorization is marked by dividing the
grouping into 2 or more subgroupings and sub-
suming each group under a separate concept.
In the administration of the test and in scoring the re-
sponses, there was no knowledge of the personality group of
the subject. An independent reliability check of the scoring
showed 96.^ agreement between the two scorers.
Results
At each age level, the subjects were matched on I.Q.
with the eight year old subjects having an average I.Q. of
102.2, the eleven year old subjects having an average I.Q.
of 101.*+, and the 14 year old subjects having an average
I.Q. of 103.7. There was no significant difference between
these I.Q. f s. Similarly, at each adjustment level, the
subjects' intelligence level was approximately equivalent.
The average I.Q. of the well adjusted subjects was 104.4;
the average I.Q. of the medium adjusted subjects was 102.4
and that of the poorly adjusted subjects was 100.3. No
significant difference was found among these I.Q. f s (see
Table 2). The mean I.Q. *s for the nine groups were also
not significantly different. The mean age for each group
was almost exactly the desired age, with a mean of 8.0
years for the eight year subject group, a mean of U.O
for the eleven year subject group, and a mean of 14.0 for
the fourteen year subject group (see Table 2).
The First Rypothesis (Adjustment and Conceptual Per-
formance ). Part A of the first hypothesis was supported by
the results (see Table 3). There was a significant finding
at the .001 level indicating that adjustment and the number
of adequate verbalizations were related. Further analysis
by the Tukey (A) Range Test indicates that the difference
between the total for well adjusted (267) and that for the
Table 3
Analysis of Variance, Trend Analysis, and
Range Test on Adequate Verbalizations
Source Ss df MS F
Age (A) 212.86 2 106.43 24.08*
Adjustment B) 141.26 2 70.63 15.98*
A xB 1.48 4
.37
Error 358.02 81 4.42
Linear 1 212.82 48.35*
Quadratic 1 .05
Age 8 11 lif **
Adjustment W M P
* P .001
** Tukey (A) Range test (Winer, 1962) - levels on separate
lines differ significantly at P .01 level unless other-
wise stated.
medium adjusted (22k) groups on adequate verbalizations
exceeded the difference of 31.8 required for significance
at the .01 level. In addition, the total of the medium
adjusted (22M-) group was significantly different from the
total of the poorly adjusted (175) group on adequate verb-
alizations (see Table 4).
Part B of the first hypothesis was confirmed; the per-
centage of formal-abstract verbalizations was related to
adjustment level at the .001 level of significance (see
Table 5). (The percentage of formal-abstract verbaliza-
tions, as well as that of functional verbalizations, is
substituted for the frequency data because the former is
a more independent measure of these responses. Analysis
of variance was performed on the frequency data and placed
in the appendix for those who might be interested.) Ejr
the use of the Tukey (A) Range test, it was ascertained
that the totals of the well adjusted (2221), of the medium
adjusted (19^0), and of the poorly adjusted (I665) groups
were significantly different with each difference between
these totals exceeding 219.6, necessary for significance
at the .01 level (see Table 6).
Part C of the first hypothesis was not supported. There
was no relationship between functional responses and adjust-
ment level although the direction of the results was in
agreement with the hypothesized effect (see Table 7). The
totals of the well adjusted group (67I) , of the medium
Table k
Means, Standard Deviations, and Totals for
Each Group for Frequency of
Adequacy of Verbalization Responses
Adjustment Level
Well Medium Poor Overall Total
M SD M SD M SD M SD
8 7.1 2.4 5.7 2.2 3.7 .6 5.5 2.4 16.5
Age
7.4Level 11 8.9 2.9 7.5 2.0 5.9 3.5 1.7 22.3
14 10.7 2.4 9.2 1.8 7.9 1.4 9.0 2.6 28.8
Overall 8.9 2.9 7.5 2.7 5.8 2.4
Total 26.7 22^ 17.5
Table 5
Analysis of Variance, Trend Analysis, and
Range Test on Formal-Abstract Percentages
Q /-v 1 1 >• /» <a Ss r
A 5841.88 2 2920.94 11.09*
B 5L52.48 2 2976.24 9.79*
A x B 480.04 4 120.01 1
Error 21319.20 81 263.20
Linear 1 5568.07 21.16*
Quadratic 1 273.80 1.04
Age 8 11 ±14. **
Adjustment W M P*
* P .01
** p .05
Table 6
Means, Standard Deviations, and Totals for
Each Group for Percentage of Formal-Abstract Responses
Well
M SD
Adjustment Level
Medium Poor
M SD M SD
Overall
M SD Total
8
Age
Level 11
67.4 22.0
75.3 14.4
52.9 22.9
66.7 18.9
41.3 29.2
59.6 19.7
53.9 27.2
67.2 18.9
161.6
201.6
Ik 79.4 9.8 7^A 8.5 65.6 12.7 73.1 10.2 219.4
Overall 74.0 15.8 64.7 20.1 55.5 23.9
Totals 222.1 19^.0 166.5
Table 7
Analysis of Variance, Trend Analysis, and Range Test
on Functional Responses Viewed as Percentages
Source Ss df MS F
Age (A) 2897.88 2 1448.94 3.50*
Adjustment (B) 1752.88 2 876.44 2.12
A x B 664-. 08 4 166.02
Error 33540.48 81 40.4.08
Linear 1 2666.67 6.44**
Quadratic 1 231.12
Age 8 11 14
* p .05
** P .02
adjusted group (901), and of the poorly adjusted group (98*0
demonstrate the hypothesized direction (see Table 8).
The first hypothesis, Part D, was confirmed; idiosyn-
cratic verbalizations and adjustment level are related at
the .001 level of significance (see Table 9). Tukey (A)
Range tests indicated that the total of the well adjusted
(20) group was significantly different from the totals of
the medium adjusted (59) and the poorly adjusted (69)
groups, the difference exceeding 25. 5> necessary for signi-
ficance at the .01 level. The totals of the latter two
groups were not significantly different (see Table 10).
Part E of the first hypothesis was not supported. There
was no relationship between split-narrow responses and adjust-
ment level, although the direction of the results was in
agreement with the hypothesized effect (see Table U). The
totals of the well adjusted group (12), of the medium ad-
justed group (17) , and of the poorly adjusted group (26)
demonstrate the hypothesized direction (see Table 12).
The Second Hypothesis (Age and Conceptual Performance ).
Part A of the second hypothesis was supported by the
results (see Table 3). There was a significant finding at
the .001 level indicating that age and the number of adequate
verbalizations were related. A trend analysis was signi-
ficantly linear at the .001 level (see Table 3). Further
analysis by the Tukey (A) Range test indicates that the
difference between the total for the Ik year old (2?8) and
Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group
for Percentage of Functional Responses
Adjustment Level
Well Medium Poor Overall Total
M SD M SD M SD M SD
8 25.5 21.9 22.5 35> 36.2 28.4 108.6
iJvel 11 22.8 14.9 27.I 18.9 28.5 17.1 26.1 17.3 78.4
14 18.8 5.9 21.2 5.1 28.6 12.0 22.9 10.1 68.6
Overall 22.3 16.0 30.0 19.3 32.8 24.8
Total 67.1 90.1 98.4
Table 9
Analysis of Variance, Trend Analysis, and
Range Test on Idiosyncratic Responses
Source Ss df MS F
A 46,41 2 23.21 8.12*
B Oc 22.35 7.81*
A x B 17.92 k 4.48 1.57
Error 231.66 81 2.86
Linear 1 38.40 13.43*
Quadratic 1 8.02
Age 8 11 14
Adjustment P H W
* P .001
Table 10
Means, Standard Deviations, and Totals for
Each Group for Frequency of Idiosyncratic Responses
Adjustment Level
Well Medium Poor Overall Total
M SD M SD M SD M SD
8 .6 .7 2.7 2.1 3> 2.3 2.2 2.2 6.7
Age
Level 11 1.0 1.2 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.2 2.1 2.1 6.2
14
.5 .9 .7 .6 .9 .6 .8 1.9
Overall
.7 .6 2.0 1.9 2.3 2.3
Total 2.0 5.9 6.9
Table 11
Analysis of Variance, Trend Analysis, and
Range Test on Split-Narrow Responses
Source Ss df MS F
A 17.16 2 8.58 8.67*
B 3.36 2 1.68 1.70
A x B 5.16 k 1.29 1.30
Error 80.19 81 .99
Linear 1 17.07 17.2^*
Quadratic 1 .09
Age 8 11 ]Zf **
* P .001
** P .01
Table 12
Means, Standard Deviations, and Totals for
Each Group for Frequency of Split-Narrow Responses
Adjustment Level
Well Medium Poor Overall
M SD M SD H SD M SD Total
8 0.7 1.3 lj* 1.8 1.4 .9 1.2 1.5 3.5
Age
.6Level 11 0.5 .6 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.1 .8 1.7
Ik 0.0 0.0 0.2 .6 0.1 0.0 .1 0.0 0.3
Overall OA .8 .6 1.2 .9 1.0
Total 1.2 1.7 2.6
that for the 11 year old (223) groups on adequate verbali-
zations exceeded the difference of 31.8 required for signi-
ficance at the .01 level. In addition, the total for the U
year old (223) group was significantly different from that
of the 8 year old (165) group on adequate verbalizations
(see Table 4).
Part B of the second hypothesis was confirmed; the per-
centage of formal-abstract verbalizations was related to age
level at the .001 level of significance (see Table 5). A
trend analysis was significantly linear at the .001 level
(see Table 5)» By the use of the Tukey (A) Range test, it
was ascertained that the totals of the 14 year old (2194),
of the 11 year old (2016), and of the 8 year old (l6l6)
groups were significantly different with each difference
between these totals exceeding 174. 5» necessary for signi-
ficance at the .05 level (see Table 6).
Part C of the second hypothesis was confirmed; age was
significantly related to the percentage of functional responses
at the .05 level (see Table 7). A trend analysis was signi-
ficantly linear at the .02 level (see Table 7). The Tukey
(A) Range test indicated that the differences between the 8
year old group (1086) and both the 11 year old (784) and 14
year old groups (686) exceeded (275.4), necessary for signi-
ficance at the .01 level (see Table 8).
Part D of the second hypothesis was confirmed; idiosyn-
cratic responses are related to age at the .001 level of
significance (see Table 9). A trend analysis was signifi-
cantly linear at the ,001 level (see Table 9). By using
the Tukey (A) Range test, it was ascertained that the
total of the 1^ year old (19) group differed from those
of the 11 year old (62) and 8 year old (6?) groups in
excess of 25.5, necessary for significance at the .01
level (see Table 10),
The second hypothesis, Part E, was confirmed; there
was a significant finding at the ,001 level indicating
that age and the number of split-narrow verbalizations
were related (see Table 11). A trend analysis was
significantly linear at the .001 level (see Table U).
The Tukey (A) Range test indicated that the totals of the
14 year old (3), of the 11 year old (1?) , and of the 8
year old (35) groups were significantly different with each
difference exceeding 13. 5> necessary for significance at
the .01 level (see Table 12).
Discussion
Adjustment and conceptual ability . The first hypothesis,
part A, was supported, and indicated that the poorly adjusted
subjects were less able to verbalize adequately the rule for
grouping objects than the well adjusted subjects. The task
involved the passive sorting phase of the object sorting
test; this phase requires the subject to verbalize con-
ventional explanations for pre-grouped objects (Rapaport,
et. al, 19^5). Apparently, the level of adjustment attained
by the subjects is associated with their ability to acquire
the conventional conceptual rules for categorizing objects;
the poorer the personality adjustment, the more inadequate
are the conceptual verbalizations. Further, the personality
adjustment test divided the subjects into three groups on
the basis of two components, the relative ability to feel
secure with oneself and to feel secure with others. These
two components are associated with a lack of cognitive
socialization. Inability to rely upon the self, feelings of
personal worthlessness, and lack of belongingness may invade
the learning process. The conceptual categories used by
others are not acquired. Similarly, social insecurity may
result in the same conceptual deficiency.
Closer examination of the task involved in the passive
sorting test indicates that an adequate response is depend-
ent upon several factors, all important to ego integration:
1) the ability to integrate the perceptual characteristics
of the objects and to delay one's response until the per-
ceptual materials have been appropriately linked with past
organized experience; 2) the previous acquisition of a
suitable class name for the stimulus configuration; 3)
the response must be readily accessible. The first factor
demands that the individual be able to make use of past
organized experiences in dealing with current sensory
impressions. Where the memory systems are depleted by
the effects of repression, the child will encounter diffi-
culty in organizing his perceptions in accordance with
realistic considerations. If it is assumed that the rela-
tively more maladjusted child tends to be involved in more
repressions, necessitated by his personal and social in-
security, he will then have less organized memories upon
which to base his current conceptual categorizations.
These will tend not to be in accord with reality to the
degree found in the relatively more adjusted child.
Hartmann (in Rapaport, 1951) states that "...many
aspects of the ego can be described as detour activities;
they promote a more specific and safer form of adjustment
by introducing a factor of growing independence from the
immediate impact of present stimuli" (p. 385). The
ability to delay, the basic tenet of secondary process
thijciking, is thus seen as being closely tied to the level
of adjustment. Furthermore, aside from the necessary matura-
tion of the perceptual processes (related to age and, there-
fore, discussed later), the capacity to delay sufficiently
is basic to producing an adequate verbalization. By
de-
laying one's initial reaction, there is a greater possi-
bility of responding on the basis of essential and defining
attributes of the objects than on trivial aspects. A correct
judgment about the sources of the perception is made more
possible. The inability to delay discharge, to be over-
whelmed by the stimuli, is frequently referred to as being
"passive" in relation to stimuli. Such passivity is de-
fined by Shapiro (in Rickers - Ovsiankina, i960, p. 156)
as "a condition of relative absence, immobilization, or
temporary relaxation of active perceptual organizing
capacities, and, accordingly, a condition in which the
perceptual experience is to a large extent dominated by,
and subject to, the most immediately manifest and sensorially
most vivid aspect of the visual surroundings... Such per-
ception would tend to be, though not necessarily be,
associated with conditions of impaired or less highly
developed psychological organization." Thus, the response
of a subject who is relatively poorly adjusted may depend
upon the hypercathexis given to some peripheral or trivial
attribute of one or more objects of the group.
The second important factor is that of having learned
a socially acceptable class response. The socialization
process (Sullivan, 1953) is impaired, the "Original Word
Game", (Brown, 1958) is inadequately carried on, the intel-
lectual stimulation from the environment is impoverished or
ineffectual. These occurrences are detrimental to cognitive
socialization. Hence, the poorly adjusted child will have
learned fewer accurate concepts.
Arieti (1959) points out that trust in oneself and
others helps in the development of verbal symbols and lan-
guage. Where such trust is absent, language development
suffers. Also, Piaget declares that the child, by co-
ordinating his thinking with the viewpoint of others,
loses his egocentric mode of thought. When there is
little ability to understand others as seen in the rela-
tively poorly adjusted child, there is less possibility
for the viewpoint of the child to be coordinated with
that of others.
In discussing the panic reaction of poorly adjusted
children to new experiences, Redl and Wineman (1957 » p.
102) point out that "there is also a nearly total absence
of the type of behavior with which an intact ego would
try to reduce newness anxiety realistically; our children
were little interested in really exploring or understanding
those new situations, they did not ask questions where
other children would have expressed curiosity, and they were
inaccessible to the offerings of adults to show them things,
to explain and interpret. They obviously did not want to
cope with the newness item. If anything they wanted to
deny it and ward it off." Thus, the poorly adjusted child
will have fewer learned social definitions of reality.
The third factor needed for an adequate verbalization
is the present availability of the previously learned re-
sponse. As Bruner (1957) indicates, the availability of
responses is based upon expectancies and needs of the in-
dividual. We have noted that the relatively poorly ad-
justed child is less likely to learn categories that
reflect accurately the environmental probabilities. Hence,
he will have categories that will be less appropriate to
the stimulus configurations of his environment. Also,
needs and fears interfere with the learning of such cate-
gories and render some of them less accessible. Since the
more maladjusted child is more fearful of entering into
social relationships, his categories will be less likely
to represent environmental probabilities. ; Even if he
does possess the class names appropriate to our stimulus
configurations, his response will nonetheless reflect a
hierarchy of accessibility that possibly reflects his own
primitive conceptions.
Part B of the first hypothesis was also supported,
indicating that the relatively poorly adjusted subjects
gave proportionably fewer formal-abstract responses than
the well-adjusted subjects. The same basic factors just
presented for adequate verbalizations are again involved.
Thus, the relatively well adjusted child can more frequent
ly provide a higher level of a more abstract verbal classi
fication than the poorly adjusted child, even when the
number of adequate verbal responses is held constant.
Hence, the relatively well adjusted child operates upon a
more formal level. He groups more frequently on the oasis
of generic class names and essential attributes in his
adequate verbalizations than the relatively poorly ad-
justed child.
No significant relationship was found between adjust-
ment level and percentage of functional responses. Func-
tional responses refer to what can be done with objects,
in terms of their use or potential use. The three differ-
ent adjustment groups offer a similar proportion of
functional rules in their adequate verbalizations.
Further inspection of the results indicates that the well
adjusted subjects had a smaller percentage of functional
responses than the medium of poorly adjusted subjects
who were not too different. Probably, functional responses
have a lower limit beyond which they cannot fall if
realistic contact with the world is to be maintained. We
all need to deal with objects and their functions in order
to retain adequate contact with the world. Since the
subjects are "normal" children, they showed no significant
differences in the proportion of functional responses.
Part D of the first hypothesis was supported with the
well adjusted subjects have significantly less idiosyncratic
verbalizations than the poorly adjusted. Thus, the better
the adjustment level, the fewer are the types of responses
held to be consistent with primary process thinking. The
greater use of fabulated responses and others belonging to
the idiosyncratic group show that the relatively poorly
adjusted children "have not sorted out those verbal rules
for grouping objects capable of being agreed to by the
authority figures" (Sullivan, 1953, p. 22*0. To attain
conceptual rules that work more or less precisely with other
people, the child has to exercise "...some degree of explora-
tion, analysis, and the obtaining of information" (Sullivan,
1953, p. 225). The relatively poorly adjusted child is more
inhibited than the well adjusted child in his exploration,
analysis, and obtaining of the necessary information by his
personal and social insecurities. Hence, his conceptual
rules still show many more characterics identifiable as
primitive or idiosyncratic.
No significant relationship was found between adjust-
ment level of frequency of split-narrow responses. This
type of verbalization refers to the dividing of the stimulus
configuration into two or more groups and providing a con-
ceptual rule for each of the smaller groups of objects
(these rules may be individually appropriate but since the
task requires a single rule for the entire configuration,
such split-narrow responses are necessarily inadequate).
Although the three adjustment groups offer a similar number
of such responses, further inspection of the results indicate
a consistent increase in the number of split-narrow responses
as the level of adjustment decreases. Since the frequency
of such responses is small, even for the relatively poorly
adjusted child, it is possible that significance would be
obtained if a larger number of subjects (and thus, a larger
number of split-narrow verbalizations) were used.
These results are in agreement with those of Schulman
(1953), Granik (1955), and Kennedy and Kates (1963) and
serve to support the notion that personality maladjustment
encroaches upon the cognitive processes and interferes with
normal developmental attainments.
Age and conceptual ability. The second hypothesis was
supported for all parts. The 14 year old subjects gave more
adequate verbalizations (part A), a higher percentage of
formal-abstract verbalizations (part B), a lower percentage
of functional responses (part C), and fewer split-narrow
responses (part E) than the 11 year old subjects. Further-
more, the U year old subjects had more adequate verbaliza-
tions than the eight year old subjects. These are grouped
together because they may all be taken as indications that
as age increases; 1) the ego reaches a higher level of in-
tegration and control (Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein, 195L,
Vol. II); 2) there is increased capacity for active per-
ceptual organization (Shapiro, in Rickers-Ovsiankina
,
i960);
3) there is an increase in intellectual ability (Piaget,
1951); and, there is an increase in conceptual ability
(Vygotsky, 1962). Thus, the older child is more advanced per-
ceptually, intellectually, and conceptually, as well as having
had a longer period of socialization and thus has developed a
larger hierarchy of socially acceptable responses.
It is noted that, for idiosyncratic verbalizations, which
are significantly related to age, the 1*4* year old subjects
gave significantly fewer than the 8 and 11 year old subjects,
while the latter two do not differ. It was noted earlier
that idiosyncratic verbalizations are to a large degree the
result of not having learned a socially acceptable response.
Thus, subjective influences, having learned a socially
acceptable response, in these younger children affect their
formulation at the rule for the pre-established conceptual
grouping. The onset of puberty marks the period of intensi-
fied socialization for the child, making him less self-
oriented and less likely to give autistic-type responses.
A question posed by this investigation dealt with the
possibility of an interaction between age and level of adjust-
ment. No such interaction was found. The performance curves
were parallel. The poorly adjusted child, for each of the
dependent variables, remains the same "distance" below the
performances of the medium adjusted child who remains the same
"distance" below the well adjusted child. The acceleration
for each is constant and equal. Thus, it would seem as if
the depressed performance is due to a blocking at an earlier
age than tested here, with this blocking acting as some sort
of "retardation constant"
. In discussing autistic children,
the conclusion was noted that "there appears to be some way
in which the children are different from the beginning of
their extrauterine existence" (Eisenberg and Kanner, 1956).
This conclusion agrees with the supposition of Bender (1956)
who sees childhood schizophrenia as involving a "maturational
lag at the embryonic level..."
. Further investigation is
needed to see if the lines remain parallel for ages below
eight, for "normal" children with different levels of adjust-
ment as well as scizpphrenic children of the same ages.
Another question posed in this study was the possibility
os significant differences between the adjustment groups at
each age level for the dependent variables. As previously
indicated, on adequate and formal-abstract verbalizations,
each group differed signigicantly from each other. This
provides a more refined measure of the adjustment factor
because we can now discuss the performance os the poorly
and well adjusted subjects as decrements or increments from
an average or medium adjusted group, as opposed to just being
able to say that they (the poorly and well adjusted subjects)
were different from each other.
Summary
The problem was to discover if poorly adjusted "normal"
children were less adequate in their conceptual behavior in a
sorting test than medium or well adjusted "normal" children.
Another objective was to see if older children manifest more
adequate conceptual behavior in this sorting test than
younger children.
The hypotheses were: 1) The well adjusted subjects will
be significantly different from the poorly adjusted subjects
with respect to adequacy of verbalization and to formal-
abstract, functional, idiosyncratic, and split-narrow verbali-
zations; 2) age will be significantly related to adequacy of
verbalization and to formal-abstract, functional, idiosyn-
cratic, and split-narrow verbalizations.
Two questions were also posed by this study: 1) Will a
significant interaction occur between age and level of adjust-
ment? 2) Will there be significant differences between the
adjustment groups at each age level for the dependent vari-
ables?
Two hundred and sixty two students from the second, fifth,
and eighth grades were administered the California Test of
Personality. From this population, 90 subjects were chosen
on the basis of their adjustment score, age, IQ, and sex.
They were then divided into three adjustment groups (well,
medium, and poor) of ten students each for each of the three
age levels (8, U, and 1*0. The groups were equated for sex
(five boys, five girls), IQ, and socioeconomic background.
Each of the 90 students was then administered the Goldstein-
Gelb-Weigl Object Sorting Test.
The well adjusted subjects were found to be significant-
ly different from poorly adjusted subjects on adequacy of
verbalization and formal-abstract and idiosyncratic verbali-
zations. Age was found to be significantly related to
adequacy of verbalization and formal-abstract, functional,
idiosyncratic, and split-narrow verbalizations. No inter-
action was found between the age and adjustment factors.
The medium adjusted group, not used previously in other
similar studies, was found to be significantly different
from the other two adjustment groups for adequate and formal-
abstract verbalizations.
The relationship between personality adjustment and con-
ceptual development is seen as dependent on ego development.
Three factors contribute to ego development: 1) the abil-
ity to integrate the perceptual characteristics of the
objects and to delay one's response until the perceptual
materials have been appropriately linked with past organized
experience; 2) the previous acquisition of a suitable class
name for the stimulus configuration; 3) the response must
be readily accessible. The relationship between age and con-
ceptual development is discussed in terms of increasing dif-
ferentiation and maturation of perceptual, intellectual, and
conceptual facilities, as well as the maturation of the ego.
The lack of an interaction between the age and adjustment
factor suggests either a slowly developing difference or a
development that took place at an earlier age than studies
here. The finding that the medium adjusted group differed
from the poor and well adjusted groups in adequate and per-
centage of fonaal verbalizations helps us to note that the
medium group may have differential conceptual abilities than
the extreme groups.
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Appendix A
Testing Form
Place:
oracle:
parentis Occupations;
TEST:
A. Example: 5 Pens - "Look at these objects that I have placed In front
of you. If you are asked why do these belong together, you could say - they
ere all pens, they are all used for writing, or they all need ink to write.
Now I will show you more groups of objects that belong together. I would like
you to tell me why they belong together. Do you understand?"
SCORING
1 £ Ball, paper circle, matchbook, sink stopper, & eraser.
~?T Large silverware, small silverware, bell, look, 2 nail
& 2 pliers.
5c Bali, sink s'topper!, 2 corks, beilT & paper circle.
~* 4 0 Large anfl small screwdriver and pliers7 small hammer &
liatcheto
.
'
"
,mi
""£7 Paper circle, green square, white caed, matchbook, rea
Igarette.
.
leuces: forks, knives, spoons, corks, nails, screw-
irivers, pliers, cigarettes, cigars, & sugar cubes.
'o Keal cigarette* sugar cubes,, filing car;,. £ reverse of H' I
rectangle*,
.
T, Si:ilc"st cpper, lmita;Lon cigar, ball* £ ©rader
9o !Pl?e» real cigar, real cigarette, Imitation of bot.T
iatchboo!c 0
tO J Large silverware and small silverware
~1
1 , ?our adnaturc tools* znlnature silvenrare, imitation
iar and cigarette, & ball.
12« lulling card, greeu rectangle, blocic of :rood t & 2 saga
pee<
ClENTSi
Appendix B
Chi Aquare on Socioeconomic Background
Chi Square on Socioeconomic Background Using the
Two Factor Index of Social Position (Hollingshead, 195?)
The father's occupation was given a rating of 1-7.
Group totals were obtained and a chi square performed on
these totals.
2 M
B
w
Obs. Freq.
Exp. Freq.
Obs. Freq.
Exp. Freq.
Obs. Freq.
Exp. Freq.
8 ii 14
52
52.9
4?
48.2
5^
51.9
153
53
52.9
46
1*8.2
51
51.9
153
55
5^.3
53
19.5
49
53.2
157
i
160 146 157 463
X2 = .8, critical value for X2 = 9.5» therefore, dif-\ .95
ference is not significant.
7 0
Appendix C
Age, IQ» and Raw Scores for Each Subject
Raw Scores
Sub- Age Adj. Ade-
IS Level Level quate Fonmal tional Sync. Nar. je
1 98 ft vv 3 2 0 0 50 33
2 145 ft\J Wn f 3 2 1 1 43 29
3 77 ftw wrl .? 3 0 1 0 100 00
4 117 QO Ww LO 3 3 2 0 50 50
5 105 fto ill Q7 8 1 0 0 89 11
6 116 ftO In 6 2 0 0 55 18
7 133 fto Wn i n 8 2 2 2 80 20
8 85 fto J 5 0 4 4 100 00
9 105 QO VV c 2 3 0 0 40 60
10 86 ft w Q7 6 2 1 0 67 22
11 122 QO Q7 6 3 2 0 6? 33
12 112 fto "NT Q7 6 2 3 0 67 22
13 94 fto Mri £J 1 3 7 6 20 60
114 94 ft M iL*T 3 1 2 1 75 25
15 96 8 M J 3 2 4 3 60 40
16 89 » Mrl 2 1 5 1 •' 67 33
17 95 QO rl Q7 5 3 0 0 56 33
18 103 Qo AS 1 l 2 2 50 50
19 108 Qo ri O£ 0 2 3 1 0 100
20 96 QO W o7 6 2 1 0 67 22
21 93 oo r r 5 0 2 2 71 0
22 116 Qo t>r o( 4 1 2 2 57 14
23 91 oO Sr U 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 89 QO r o 0 2 7 1 0 100
25 78 ftO "Dr oC. 1 1 4 0 50 50
26 105 oO "Dr o 1 2 8 1 33 67
27 114 Qo r It 3 1 3 1 75 25
28 83 Qo r TX 0 1 2 2 0 100
29 97 8 P 5 3 2 2 2 60 40
30 126 8 P 6 4 1 4 3 67 17
Raw Scores
m ^7
Sub-
.iect#
31
j
i<i :
107
\pe Ad. i m Ade-
Level Level quate Formal
Func-
tional
Idio-
sync.
Split Formal Functio
Nar. % %
11 w 10 7 2 0 0 70 20
32 113 U w 11 9 1 0 0 82 9
33 102 U w 9 2 m A «*i6^ 82 18
34 81 11 w 0 6 0 1 1 100 0
35 105 U T Tw /0 2 0 0 °7 33
36 103 11 w 10 6 2 1 60
37 104 11 w 12 11 1 0
A0 92 QO
38 105 11 w 0 5 1 3 2 83 17
39 96 11 w 9 6 3 0
A0 07 33
40 103 11 w 8
i.
4- 3 1 50 50
41 133 11 M 8 5 3 0 0 63 38
42 94 u M 1. 3 1 6 1 75 25
43 97 u M 6 1 5 0 17 07
44 110 11 M 9 6 2 0 A o7 99
45 100 11 M 11 8 2 0
A0 73 10
46 82 u M 10 9 0 1 0 90 u
47 91 11 M 6 5 0
A0 83 U
48 84 11 M 8
>>
6 2 1 A0 75 9
£
49 98 11 M 7 3 1
A0 57 ko
50 107 u M 6 2 5 A0 Of
51 83 11 P 5 2 3 6 -L
52 93 11 P 7 5 2 2
0£ •71 9Q
53 109 11 P 6 5 1 1 •i-r
5^ 109 11 P 1 2 5 3
0 c
^5
55 112 11 P 5 1 3
A0 &n 90
56 119 11 P 3 1 6 3 (D
9 ^
57 105 11 P 9 3 2
TX
58 90 11 P 5 3 2 1 U
lid
59 102 11 P 9 7 1 0 0 78
11
60 104 11 P 5 2 0 0 0 0
7 2
Raw Scores
Sub- Age Adj. Ade- Func- Idio- Split Formal Functional
.ject# IQ Level Level quate Formal tional sync, Nar. $> #
61 108 14 W 12 10 2 0 0 83 17
62 108 14 w 11 8 2 1 0 73 17
63 115 14 w 11 7 3 0 0 64 27
64 113 14 w 10 7 3 0 0 70 30
65 103 14 w 11 9 1 0 0 82 9
66 91 14 w 10 8 2 1 0 80 20
67 98 14 w 11 10 1 1 0 91 9
68 109 14 w 10 7 3 0 0 70 30
69 98 14 w 11 10 1 0 0 91 9
70 101 14 w 10 8 1 1 0 80 10
71 104 14 M 7 5 2 1 0 71 29
72 106 14 M 9 8 1 0 0 89 11
73 87 14 M 8 6 2 1 0 75 25
74 112 14 M 7 4 2 2 0 57 29
75 94 14 H 10 8 2 1 0 80 20
76 114 14 M 10 7 2 1 .0 70 20
77 103 14 M 10 8 2 2 2 80 20
78 106 14 M 9 6 2 1 0 67 22
79 114 14 M 11 9 2 0 0 82 18
80 104 14 K 11 8 2 0 0 73 18
81 102 14 P 8 6 2 0 0 75 25
82 104 14 P 6 3 2 0 0 50 33
83 91 14 P 6 3 3 0 0 50 50
84 104 14 P 10 6 3 0 0 60 30
85 106 14 P 8 5 3 1 0 63 37
86 107 14 P 10 8 1 0 0 80 10
87 110 14 P 9 8 1 1 1 89
11
88 96 14 P 7 4 2 0 0 57 29
89 105 14 P 7 4 3 1 0 57
43
90 97 14 P 8 6 2 3 0 75
25
Appendix D
Additional Analyses of Variance
Table 1
Analysis of Variance, Trend Analysis, and
Range Test on Formal-Abstract Responses
Source Ss df MS F
A 183.76 2 91*88 23.99*
B 129.02 22 64. 5L 16.84*
A x B .92 ^ .23
Error 310.23 81 3.83
Linear 1 183.75 ^7.97*
Quadratic 1 .01
Age 8 11 14
Adjustment W MP
* P .001
Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Totals for
Each Group for Frequency of Foimal-Abstract Responses
Adjustment Level
Well Medium Poor Overall
H §£ M SD M SD j| SD
8 4.7 2.1 3.3 2.2 2.1 1.8 3.3 2.2Age
Level 11 6.7 2.2 5.1 2.2 3.6 1.7 5.1 2.5
14 8.4 1.2 6.9 1.5 5.3 1.7 6.8 1.8
Overall 6.6 2.4 5.1 2.5 3.7 2.7
Total 198 153 no
Table 3
Analysis of Variance on Functional Responses
Source Ss df MS F
A 2.01+ 2 1.02 1.07
B 3.6^ 2 1.82 1.92
A x B 4.32 1.08 1.1*
Error 76.95 81 .95
Table k
Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group
for Frequency of Functional Responses
Well
M SD
Adjustment Level
Medium Poor
M SD M SD
Overall
M SD Total
8 1.8 1.2 2.0 .8 1.1 .3 1.6 .9
Age
1.6Level 11 2.0 1.3 1.9 1.2 .9 1.8 1.2 55
1^ 1.9 .8 1.9 .3 2.2 .8 2.0 .7 60
Overall 1.9 1.1 1.9 .9 1.6 .9
Total 57 58
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